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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 19-1663
_______________
PAIGE E. LESHER,
Appellant
v.
CLARK ZIMMERMAN, In his individual capacity;
HAMBURG AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5-17-cv-04731)
District Judge: Hon. Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 22, 2020
______________
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: August 10, 2020)
______________
OPINION *
______________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, appellant Paige E. Lesher appeals the District
Court’s grant of appellees’ Clark Zimmerman and the Hamburg Area School District (the
“School District,” and collectively, “Appellees”) motions to dismiss the Amended
Complaint. Lesher’s Amended Complaint alleges that Zimmerman caused injuries
during a high school softball practice that violated Lesher’s “constitutional right to be
free from bodily harm and . . . her right to bodily integrity” under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 1 In violating her due process rights, Lesher contends
that Zimmerman’s actions gave rise to a state-created danger because (i) the harm he
caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; and (ii) he acted with deliberate indifference.
Lesher further claims that the School District is liable for its failure to adequately
discipline Zimmerman under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York. 2 In opposition, Zimmerman contends that Lesher failed to adequately plead a statecreated danger claim and therefore, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Likewise, the
School District argues that Lesher failed to plead factually plausible allegations to
establish Monell liability.
We conclude that Lesher has failed to adequately plead a claim for state-created
danger. And the Monell claim against the School District is dismissed as a matter of law.
As such, we will affirm the District Court’s decision to dismiss the Amended Complaint
for the following reasons.
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I.
Lesher, then a senior student and pitcher on the Hamburg Area High School
varsity softball team, was warming up for practice one day in the pitcher’s mound. At the
same time, Zimmerman, then teacher and softball coach, approached Lesher and directed
her to pitch to him. Although Zimmerman had never asked Lesher to pitch to him before,
Lesher obliged. When she pitched the ball, Zimmerman took a full swing and hit a line
drive straight at Lesher, who was not standing behind a pitcher’s protective screen or
wearing a mouth guard. The ball hit Lesher directly in the face, causing serious injuries,
including the loss of four teeth and a fractured jaw. These injuries required at least eight
surgical procedures and several root canals.
Following the incident, Lesher filed a lawsuit under § 1983 against Zimmerman,
in his individual capacity, and the School District. Appellees moved to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The motions to dismiss were granted, and Lesher was given leave to file an Amended
Complaint. In her Amended Complaint, Lesher alleges a state-created danger claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause against Zimmerman, and that the
School District is liable under a Monell claim for failing to discipline Zimmerman and
allowing a custom of unsafe practices to take place.
Appellees moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. The District Court granted
the motions with prejudice. Lesher filed this timely appeal.
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II.
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Lesher’s § 1983
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review of a denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). 3 When evaluating a ruling on a motion to dismiss, “we accept all factual
allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” 4 A claim is said to have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” 5 A defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s
complaint fails to adequately state a claim in which relief can be granted. 6
III.
Lesher raises two arguments on appeal. First, that because the District Court
failed to give her the benefit of reasonable inferences from her alleged facts, it erred by
holding that Lesher did not adequately establish two elements of her state-created danger
claim: foreseeability and deliberate indifference. Second, that the District Court erred in
holding that the Monell claim against the School District was inadequately pled. We
address each point in turn.
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A.
In order to successfully plead a state-created danger claim, Lesher needed to allege
that:
(1) the harm ultimately caused [by the state actor’s conduct] was foreseeable
and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that
shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff
existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts,
or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm
brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member of the public in
general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way
that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all. 7
Lesher has failed to plead facts sufficient to find the first two elements of a state-created
danger claim.
Foreseeability requires the plaintiff to “allege an awareness on the part of the state
actors that rises to [the] level of actual knowledge or an awareness of risk that is
sufficiently concrete to put the actors on notice of the harm.”8 In an attempt to satisfy the
foreseeability element, Lesher alleges that Zimmerman and his assistant coaches
“routinely used a protective pitching screen for their own protection when pitching
batting practice to members of the team,” and “at the time of [Lesher’s] injuries, there
was a growing trend in high school and collegiate girls’ softball for pitchers to wear
protective face masks when pitching.” 9 She also alleges that the School District’s
handbook contemplated harm, such as that experienced by Lesher, when it prohibited
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male players from playing on women’s teams due to the physical differences, including
size, power and speed, between male and female athletes.
For many of the reasons explained by the District Court, these allegations are
insufficient to establish foreseeability. Specifically, Lesher does not allege any prior
incidents in which coaches or players were injured while pitching, nor facts indicating
that pitching screens actually prevented any softball related injuries. Moreover, players
and coaches have different roles, and the use of a pitching screen by a coach does not
show foreseeability of harm to a player. Similarly, the School District’s handbook
regulates participation of male athletes on female sports teams, and is silent on
participation of male coaches during practice. Finally, the recent trend for some softball
pitchers to wear protective masks does not show the harm or risk of Lesher’s injury was
“foreseeable and fairly direct.” As stated, Lesher does not allege any other instances of
injury caused by Zimmerman while batting, nor any prior incidents with similar
circumstances. As such, even in the light most favorable to Lesher, we cannot conclude
that she has pled sufficient facts to show that Zimmerman was on notice of the harm.
As to the second element of a state-created danger claim, whether the state actor
acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience, the inquiry is case
specific. 10 Here, the District Court correctly determined that Lesher need only
demonstrate deliberate indifference because Zimmerman had the opportunity to
deliberate, rather than being forced into a “split-second” decision. 11 Accordingly, we
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evaluate whether Zimmerman’s behavior shocks the conscience by demonstrating a
deliberate indifference to the risk of harm. 12
In the absence of a foreseeable risk, Lesher has necessarily failed to plead
deliberate indifference. 13 Even if the harm was foreseeable, Lesher has failed to
sufficiently allege that Zimmerman was deliberately indifferent. Considering the typical
risks associated with playing softball, as unfortunate as Lesher’s injuries are, they are the
type that can be reasonably contemplated when participating in such sporting activities. 14
As such, Zimmerman’s conduct cannot be considered so deliberately indifferent so as to
shock the conscience, and Lesher has insufficiently pled her state-created danger claim.
B.
A municipality, such as the School District, can face civil liability “under § 1983
only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” 15 A
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plaintiff can establish § 1983 liability of a municipality two ways: by establishing a
custom or policy. 16 The established custom or policy, however, must be “the ‘moving
force’ behind the injury alleged.”17 Policies include “a statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a government] body’s officers,” while
a custom is a permanent and well-established practice. 18 Additionally, a municipality can
only be held liable under § 1983 for failing to adequately train employees when its
“failure . . . in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its
inhabitants . . . .”19
Because we conclude that there has been no violation of Lesher’s constitutional
rights, the claims against the School District must be dismissed as a matter of law. 20
Even if this were not the case, Lesher has failed to show that the School District caused
the alleged constitutional violation.
Lesher’s allegations against the School District fall within two categories: (1)
failing to discipline Zimmerman and other athletic coaches when they allegedly engaged
in unsafe practices; and (2) failing to ensure Zimmerman utilized safety equipment during
practices.
As stated by the District Court, Lesher’s allegations that the School District had
knowledge of prior incidents involving Zimmerman are largely legal conclusions that are
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not entitled to a presumption of truth.21 Moreover, the prior incidents that Lesher
references in her Amended Complaint either involved different sports with different
coaches, or complaints against Zimmerman that are unrelated to the misuse of safety
equipment, and are otherwise dissimilar to the incident in question here. None of these
prior incidents show that a School District custom or policy led to Lesher’s injuries.
IV.
Lesher’s injuries are certainly regrettable. However, our decision cannot be
guided by sympathy, rather, it must be rooted in the law. As such, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court for the foregoing reasons.
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